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Abstract—In this paper, we study resource allocation algorithm
design for secure multi-user downlink ultra-reliable low latency
communication (URLLC). To enhance physical layer security
(PLS), the base station (BS) is equipped with multiple antennas
and artificial noise (AN) is injected by the BS to impair the
eavesdroppers’ channels. To meet the stringent delay require-
ments in secure URLLC systems, short packet transmission (SPT)
is adopted and taken into consideration for resource allocation
design. The resource allocation algorithm design is formulated as
an optimization problem for minimization of the total transmit
power, while guaranteeing quality-of-service (QoS) constraints
regarding the URLLC users’ number of transmitted bits, packet
error probability, information leakage, and delay. Due to the non-
convexity of the optimization problem, finding a global solution
entails a high computational complexity. Thus, we propose a
low-complexity algorithm based successive convex approximation
(SCA) to find a sub-optimal solution. Our simulation results
show that the proposed resource allocation algorithm design
ensures the secrecy of the URLLC users’ transmissions, and
yields significant power savings compared to a baseline scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, ultra-reliable low latency communication
(URLLC) has received considerable attention from academia
and industry. URLLC is required for mission critical
applications, such as factory automation, autonomous driving,
tactile internet, e-health, and virtual reality [1]. URLLC
entails strict quality-of-service (QoS) requirements including
a low packet error probability (e.g., 10−6) and a very low
latency (e.g., 1ms) [1]. In addition, the data packet size
is typically small, e.g., around 160 bits [2]. Unfortunately,
existing mobile communication systems cannot meet these
requirements. For example, for the long term evolution (LTE)
system, the frame duration is 10ms, which already exceeds
the total latency requirement of URLLC applications [3]. The
main challenges for the design of URLLC systems are the
two contradicting requirements of ultra high reliability and
low latency.
Furthermore, security is a fundamental issue in wireless
communication systems due to the broadcast nature of the
wireless medium. Traditionally, communication security was
provided by cryptographic encryption methods in the appli-
cation layer. However, cryptographic methods rely on the
assumption that the computational power of eavesdroppers is
limited. Considering recent advances in quantum computing,
this assumption may no longer be justified. An alternative
approach to ensuring secrecy in communication systems is
physical layer security (PLS). The principle of PLS is to
exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless channel
to provide perfect communication secrecy independent of
the computational capabilities of the eavesdroppers. In [4],
the authors studied secure resource allocation and scheduling
in orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA)
networks. In [5], the authors investigated the secrecy rate
optimization in a multiple-input single-output (MISO) system
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The authors in [6]
studied resource allocation for MISO systems, where artificial
noise (AN) was injected at the base station (BS) to further
enhance PLS. However, the schemes proposed in [4]–[6] were
designed based on the secrecy capacity which assumes infinite
length codes [7]. Hence, such codes are not applicable for
URLLC, since URLLC employs short packet transmission
(SPT) to achieve low latency.
Recently, there has been a significant amount of work on the
performance limits of SPT. These performance limits provide
a relation between the achievable rate, the packet length, and
the decoding error probability [8], [9]. The seminal work in
[8] investigated the limits of SPT for discrete memoryless
channels, while the authors in [10] extended this analysis
to different types of channels, including the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. The authors in [11]–[14]
investigated the resource allocation algorithm design for multi-
user downlink URLLC systems. Nevertheless, the existing
URLLC designs in [8]–[15] do not take into account secrecy,
and hence, cannot guarantee PLS. The maximum secrecy rate
for SPT over a wiretap channel was provided recently in [16].
Furthermore, in [17], the performance limits of secure SPT
were studied. However, the author of [17] focused on the case
of a single user system, i.e., a single legitimate user and single
eavesdropper. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the re-
source allocation design for secure multi-user downlink MISO-
URLLC systems has not been investigated in the literature,
yet.
Motivated by the above discussion, in this paper, we pro-
pose a novel secure resource allocation algorithm design for
multi-user downlink MISO-URLLC systems. The resource
allocation algorithm design is formulated as an optimization
problem with the goal of minimizing the total transmit power
subject to the QoS constraints of the URLLC users. The
QoS constraints include the minimum number of securely
transmitted bits, the maximum packet error probability, the
maximum information leakage, and the maximum time for
transmission of a packet (i.e., the maximum delay)1. The
formulated problem is non-convex and finding the global
optimum solution requires high computational complexity.
Therefore, we develop a low-complexity resource allocation
algorithm based on successive convex approximation (SCA)
which finds a sub-optimal solution.
Notations: In this paper, lower-case letters refer to scalar
numbers, while bold lower and upper case letters denote vec-
tors and matrices, respectively. Tr (A) and Rank (A) denote
the trace and the rank of matrix A, respectively. A  0
indicates that matrix A is positive semi-definite. AH and AT
denote the Hermitian transpose and the transpose of matrix
A, respectively. C is the set of complex numbers. IN is the
N × N identity matrix. HN denotes the set of all N × N
Hermitian matrices. | · | and ‖ · ‖ refer to the absolute value of
a complex scalar and the Euclidean vector norm, respectively.
The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
(CSCG) vector with mean vector x and and covariance matrix
Σ is denoted by CN (x,Σ), and ∼ stands for “distributed
as”. E{·} denotes statistical expectation. ∇xf(x) denotes the
gradient vector of function f(x) and its elements are the partial
derivatives of f(x).
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
In this section, we present the considered system and
channel models.
A. System Model
We consider a single-cell multi-user downlink system which
comprises a BS equipped with NT antennas,K single-antenna
URLLC users indexed by k = {1, . . . ,K}, and J single
antenna eavesdroppers indexed by j = {1, . . . , J}, cf. Fig. 1.
The total bandwidth is W . We assume that a resource frame
has a duration of Tf seconds and is divided into N time
slots indexed by n = {1, . . . , N}. Each time slot n comprises
n¯ symbol intervals. The value of n¯ depends on the system
bandwidth W and the total frame duration Tf , i.e., n¯ =
WTf
N
which is assumed to be integer. Furthermore, perfect channel
state information (CSI) is assumed to be available at the BS
for resource allocation design2. We assume that the maximum
affordable delay of each user is known at the BS and only
users whose delay requirements can potentially be met in the
current frame are admitted into the system.
In this paper, we assume linear transmit precoding at the
BS. Hence, the signal vector transmitted by the BS in time
1We note that the end-to-end (E2E) delay of data packet transmission
comprises various components including the transmission delay, queueing
delay, propagation delay, and routing delay in the backhaul and core networks.
In this work, we focus on the transmission delay, which is independent of the
other components of the E2E delay.
2In practice, the BS may not be able to obtain perfect CSI, especially for
the eavesdroppes’ channels. Hence, the results in this paper can serve as a
performance upper bound for system with imperfect CSI.
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Fig. 1. Multi-user downlink URLLC system with a BS, K
URLLC users, and J eavesdroppers.
slot n to the K users is given by
x[n] =
K∑
k=1
wk[n]uk[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+ v[n]︸︷︷︸
AN
, (1)
where wk[n] ∈ CNT×1 and uk[n] ∈ C, E{|uk[n]|2} =
1, ∀k = {1, . . . ,K}, are the beamforming vector and the
transmit symbol of user k in time slot n, respectively. More-
over, v[n] is an AN vector generated by the transmitter to
degrade the eavesdroppers’ channels. v[n] is modelled as a
complex Gaussian random vector, v[n] ∼ CN (0,V[n]), with
covariance matrix V[n] ∈ HNT , V[n]  0.
B. Channel Model
In this paper, we assume a quasi static flat-fading channel
whose coherence time exceeds Tf . Therefore, the channel
gains of all users are assumed to be fixed during the entire
frame duration. The signals received at user k and eavesdrop-
per j in time slot n are given as follows:
yk[n] = h
H
k x[n] + wk[n], ∀k, (2)
yj [n] = g
H
j x[n] + w
e
j [n], ∀j, (3)
where hk ∈ CNT×1 and gj ∈ CNT×1 are the channel
vectors from the BS to user k and eavesdropper j, respectively.
Besides, wk[n] ∼ CN (0, σ2) and wej [n] ∼ CN (0, σ
2) are the
complex AWGN3 at user k and eavesdropper j, respectively.
By substituting (1) into (2), the signal received at user k in
time slot n is given as follows:
yk[n] = h
H
k
(
K∑
l=1
wl[n]ul[n] + v[n]
)
+ wk[n], (4)
= hHk wk[n]uk[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+
K∑
l 6=k
hHk wl[n]ul[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
multi-user interference (MUI)
+hHk v[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN
+wk[n].
3Without loss of generality, we assume that the noise processes at all
receivers have identical variances.
Similarly, the received signal for user k at eavesdropper j in
time slot n can be expressed as follows:
yj,k[n] = g
H
j
(
K∑
l=1
wl[n]ul[n] + v[n]
)
+ wej [n], (5)
= gHj wk[n]uk[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
user’s k signal
+
K∑
l 6=k
gHj wl[n]ul[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MUI
+ gHj v[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN
+wej [n].
Moreover, for future use, we define the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio (SINR) for user k and eavesdropper j in time
slot n, respectively, as follows:
γk[n] =
|hHk wk[n]|
2∑K
l 6=k |h
H
k wl[n]|
2 +Tr(hkhHk V[n]) + σ
2
, (6)
γj,k[n] =
|gHj wk[n]|
2∑K
l 6=k |g
H
j wl[n]|
2 + Tr(gjgHj V[n]) + σ
2
. (7)
In this paper, we treat the MUI caused by the signals of other
users as noise. Moreover, we assume a normalized channel
model such that σ2 = 1 holds.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the achievable secrecy rate
for SPT and the QoS requirements of the URLLC users.
Furthermore, we formulate the proposed resource allocation
optimization problem for secure multi-user downlink MISO-
URLLC systems.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate for SPT
In their seminal works, Wyner [7] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[18] characterized the secrecy capacity. It was shown that both
the error probability and the information leakage can be made
arbitrarily small as long as the transmission rate is below the
secrecy capacity and the data are mapped to sufficiently long
codewords, i.e., the packet length goes to infinity. Because
of the latter condition, the secrecy capacity cannot be used
for resource allocation design in secure URLLC systems, as
URLLC systems have to employ short packets to achieve
low latency. Furthermore, as a result of using short packets,
decoding errors and information leakage become unavoidable.
The achievable secrecy rate for SPT was analyzed in [16] and
a closed-form approximation, the so-called normal approxima-
tion, was developed for the AWGN channel. Mathematically,
the maximum number of secret communication bits transmit-
ted in a packet of L symbols to a legitimate receiver with error
probability ǫ and information leakage δ can be approximated
as follows [16, Eq. (108)]:
B¯ = LC¯s − aQ
−1(ǫ)
√
LVm − aQ
−1(δ)
√
LVe, (8)
where a = log(e), and the secrecy capacity is given by
C¯s = log2(1 + γm)− log2(1 + γe). (9)
Here, Q−1(·) is the inverse of the Gaussian Q-function,
Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt, and Vm and Ve are the chan-
nel dispersions of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels,
respectively. For the complex AWGN channel, the channel
dispersion is given as follows [9]:
Vi =
(
1−
1
(1 + γi)2
)
, ∀i ∈ {m, e}, (10)
where γi is the received SINR at receiver i, i.e., at the
legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper.
For (8), it was assumed that all symbols in the packet
have the same SINR. However, for the case where the SINRs
of different symbols may not be identical, using a similar
approach as in [9, Eq. (4.277)], [19, Fig. 1], the maximum
number of secret communication bits for SPT can be expressed
as follows:
Bsec = LCs − aQ
−1(ǫ)
√√√√ L∑
l=1
Vm[l]− aQ
−1(δ)
√√√√ L∑
l=1
Ve[l],(11)
where the secrecy capacity in this case is given by:
Cs =
1
L
( L∑
l=1
log2(1 + γm[l])−
L∑
l=1
log2(1 + γe[l])
)
,(12)
Here, Vm[l], Ve[l], γm[l], and γe[l] denote the channel
dispersion for the legitimate receiver, the channel dispersion
for the eavesdropper, the SINR at the legitimate receiver, and
the SINR at the eavesdropper in symbol interval l, respectively.
In this paper, the resource allocation algorithm design for
secure MISO-URLLC is based on (11).
B. QoS Requirements of URLLC Users
The QoS requirements of URLLC user k comprise a min-
imum number of securely received bits, denoted by B
req
k , a
maximum packet error probability denoted by ǫk, the maxi-
mum number of time slots available for transmission of the
user’s packet, denoted by Dk, and the maximum information
leakage δj,k to eavesdropper j. According to (11), the total
number of secret communication bits transmitted over the
resources allocated to user k in the N available time slots
in the presence of J eavesdroppers can be written as:
Bseck (wk,V) = n¯
N∑
n=1
log(1+γk[n])−aQ
−1(ǫk)
(
n¯
N∑
n=1
Vk[n]
) 1
2
− max
j∈{1,2,··· ,J}
[
n¯
N∑
n=1
log(1 + γi,k[n])
+ aQ−1(δj,k)
(
n¯
N∑
n=1
Vj,k[n]
) 1
2
]
, (13)
where V denotes the collection of optimization variables
V[n], ∀n, wk denotes the collection of optimization variables
wk[n], ∀n, and
Vk[n] = 1−
1
(1 + γk[n])2
, Vj,k[n] = 1−
1
(1 + γj,k[n])2
.
Moreover, to meet the delay requirement of user k, we
assign all symbols of user k to the first Dk time slots. This
means that the value of γk[n], and thus, the value of wk[n],
should be zero for user k if n > Dk. In other words, users
requiring low latency are assigned resources at the beginning
of the frame by controlling the value of wk[n], ∀k, n. Then, a
user can start decoding as soon as it has received all symbols
that contain its data, i.e., after Dk time slots.
C. Optimization Problem Formulation
In the following, we formulate the proposed resource allo-
cation optimization problem for the minimization of the total
transmit power under constraints on the QoS of each user
regarding the received number of secrecy bits, the reliability,
the latency, and the information leakage. In particular, the
beamforming and the AN policies are determined by solving
the following optimization problem:
minimize
w,V∈HNT
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
‖wk[n]‖
2 +
N∑
n=1
Tr(V[n]) (14)
s.t. C1 : Bseck (wk,V) ≥ B
req
k , ∀k,
C2 : wk[n] = 0, ∀n > Dk, ∀k,
C3 : V[n]  0, ∀n,
where w denotes the collection of optimization variables
wk, ∀k. The optimization problem in (14) is non-convex. The
non-convexity arises from constraint C1 which involves the
non-convex SINR expressions and the non-convex secrecy rate
formula for SPT. In general, there is no systematic method for
solving non-convex optimization problems in polynomial time.
Nevertheless, in the next section, we propose a low-complexity
algorithm to find a sub-optimal solution for optimization
problem (14).
IV. SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
In the following, we propose a low-complexity resource
allocation algorithm based on SCA to solve optimization
problem (14) and to obtain a sub-optimal resource allocation
policy with low computational complexity. The proposed al-
gorithm design tackles problem (14) in three main steps as
outlined in the following. First, we transform the problem
into a more tractable form using semi-definite programming
(SDP). Second, we apply a series of transformations based
on auxiliary variables and Taylor series expansion to obtain
an approximated convex problem. Finally, a penalized SCA
algorithm is proposed to iteratively solve the approximated
convex problem, and to find a sub-optimal solution for problem
(14).
A. Semi-Definite Programming
To facilitate solving problem (14) using SDP, we define
Wk[n] = wk[n]w
H
k [n], Hk = hkh
H
k , and Gj = gjg
H
j .
Therefore, problem (14) can be rewritten in equivalent form
as follows:
minimize
W,V∈HNT
G(W,V) (15)
s.t. C1 :Bseck (Wk,V) ≥ B
req
k , ∀k,
C2 :Tr (Wk[n]) = 0, ∀n > Dk, ∀k,
C3 :V[n]  0, ∀n,
C4 :Wk[n]  0, ∀k, n,
C5 :Rank(Wk[n]) ≤ 1, ∀k, n,
where Wk is the collection of optimization variables
Wk[n], ∀n, and W is the collection of optimization variables
Wk, ∀k. Wk[n]  0 and Rank(Wk[n]) ≤ 1, ∀k, n, in
constraints C4 and C5 are imposed to ensure that Wk[n] =
wk[n]w
H
k [n] holds after optimization, and
G(W,V) =
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
Tr (Wk[n]) +
N∑
n=1
Tr(V[n]).
Moreover, to facilitate the solution of problem (15), constraint
C1 is rewritten as follows:
C1 : Rk(Wk,V)− Vk(Wk,V)−
max
j∈{1,2,··· ,J}
CEj,k(Wk,V) ≥ B
req
k , ∀k, (16)
where Rk(Wk,V) = n¯
N∑
n=1
log(1 + γk[n]), (17)
Vk(Wk,V) = Q
−1(ǫk)
(
n¯
N∑
n=1
Vk[n]
) 1
2
, (18)
and
CEj,k(Wk,V) = n¯
N∑
n=1
log(1 + γj,k[n])
+Q−1(δj,k)
(
n¯
N∑
n=1
Vj,k[n]
) 1
2
, (19)
where
γk[n] =
Tr (HkWk[n])∑K
k 6=l Tr (HkWl[n]) + Tr(HkV[n]) + 1
, (20)
γj,k[n] =
Tr (GjWk[n])∑K
k 6=l Tr (GjWl[n]) + Tr(GjV[n]) + 1
. (21)
B. Problem Transformation
In the following, we tackle the non-convexity of problem
(15) arising from non-convex constraints C1 and C5. For
constraint C1, we first apply a series of transformations
based on auxiliary slack variables. Subsequently, Taylor series
expansion is used to find a convex approximation for the non-
convex parts. For constraint C5, we resort to the well-known
semi-definite relaxation (SDR). Using slack variables τk, ∀k,
we rewrite constraint C1 equivalently as follows:
C1a : Rk(Wk,V) − Vk(Wk,V)− τk ≥ B
req
k , ∀k, (22)
C1b : τk ≥ C
E
j,k(Wk,V), ∀j, ∀k. (23)
One reason for the non-convexity of constraints (22) and (23)
is the structure of the SINRs in (20) and (21). To tackle this
non-convexity, we introduce auxiliary variables ak[n], ∀k, n,
and bj,k[n], ∀j, k, n, to bound the SINRs in (20) and (21),
respectively. By substituting ak[n], ∀k, n, and bj,k[n], ∀j, k, n,
for γk[n], ∀k, n, and γj,k[n], ∀j, k, n, respectively, in functions
Rk(Wk,V), Vk(Wk,V), and C
E
j,k(Wk,V), we get new
functions Rk(ak), Vk(ak), and C
E
j,k(bj,k), respectively, where
ak and bj,k are the collections of optimization variables
ak[n], ∀n, and bj,k[n], ∀n, respectively. This leads to the
equivalent optimization problem:
minimize
W,V∈HNT ,τ ,a,b
G(W,V) (24)
s.t. C1a :Rk(ak)− Vk(ak)− τk ≥ B
req
k , ∀k,
C1b :τk ≥ C
E
j,k(bj,k), ∀j, k,
C2 :Tr (Wk[n]) = 0, ∀n ≥ Dk, ∀k,
C3 :V[n]  0, ∀n,
C4 :Wk[n]  0, ∀k, n,
C5 :Rank(Wk[n]) ≤ 1, ∀k, n,
C6 :ak[n] ≤ γk[n], ∀k, n,
C7 :bj,k[n] ≥ γj,k[n], ∀j, k, n,
where τ , a, and b denote the collections of optimization vari-
ables τk, ∀k, ak[n], ∀k, n, and bj,k[n], ∀j, k, n, respectively.
Theorem 1. Optimization problems (15) and (24) are equiva-
lent and share the same solution for W and V.
Proof. Optimization problem (24) can be formulated as a
monotonic optimization problem. As a result, constraints C6
and C7 in (24) have to hold with equality. Hence, it can be
shown that (15) and (24) are equivalent. A more detailed proof
is omitted here due to the space limitation. See [14] for a
similar proof. 
To facilitate the application of SCA [14], [20], [21], we
use Taylor series to approximate for the non-convex terms in
constraints C1a and C1b in (24). This leads to the following
convex constraints:
C1a : Rk(ak)− V˜k(ak)− τk ≥ B
req
k , ∀k, (25)
C1b : τk ≥ C˜
E
j,k(bj,k), ∀j, k, (26)
where
V˜k(ak) = Vk(a
(i)
k ) +∇ak(Vk)(ak − a
(i)
k ), ∀k,
C˜Ej,k(bj,k) = C
E
j,k(b
(i)
j,k) +∇bj,k(C
E
j,k)(bj,k − b
(i)
j,k), ∀j, k,
and a
(i)
k and b
(i)
j,k are the feasible points from the previous
SCA iteration.
Next, we tackle the non-convex constraints C6 and C7. For
C6, we define slack optimization variables qk[n], ∀k, n, and
zk[n], ∀k, n, to lower bound the numerator and to upper bound
the denominator of γk[n], ∀k, n, in constraint C6, respectively,
as follows:
C6a : Tr(HHk Wk[n]) ≥ q
2
k[n], ∀k, n, (27)
C6b :
∑
k 6=l
Tr(HHk Wl[n])
+ Tr(HHk V[n]) + 1 ≤ zk[n], ∀k, n, (28)
C6c :
q2k[n]
zk[n]
≥ ak[n], ∀k, n. (29)
The new constraints C6a and C6b are convex, however,
constraint C6c in (29) is still non-convex. Thus, we use a
Taylor series to get a first order approximation as follows:
C6c : 2
(
q
(i)
k [n]/z
(i)
k [n]
)
qk[n]
−
(
q
(i)
k [n]/z
(i)
k [n]
)2
zk[n] ≥ ak[n], ∀k, n, (30)
where q
(i)
k [n] and z
(i)
k [n] are feasible points from the previous
SCA iteration.
Similarly, for non-convex constraint C7, we introduce aux-
iliary variables fj,k[n], ∀j, k, n, to obtain the following equiv-
alent constraints:
C7a :bj,k[n]

∑
k 6=l
Tr(GHe Wl[n]) + Tr(G
H
e V[n]) + 1


≥
(
fj,k[n]
)2
, ∀j, k, n, (31)
C7b :
(
fj,k[n]
)2
≥ Tr(GHe Wk[n]), ∀j, k, n, (32)
and by using the S-Procedure [22], we can transform con-
straint C7a in (31) into the following positive semi-definite
constraint:
C7a :
[
bj,k[n] fj,k[n]
fj,k[n]
∑
k 6=l Tr(G
H
j Wl[n]) + Tr(G
H
j V[n]) + 1
]
≥ 0, ∀j, k, n. (33)
Now, we use again a Taylor series to obtain a first order
approximation of the right hand side of (32) as follows:
C7b :
(
f
(i)
j,k[n]
)2
+ 2f
(i)
j,k[n](fj,k[n]− f
(i)
j,k[n])
≥ Tr(GHj Wk[n]), ∀j, k, n, (34)
where f
(i)
j,k[n], ∀j, k, n, are feasible points from the previous
SCA iteration.
The only remaining non-convex constraint in (24) is the
rank constraint. By applying SDR, i.e., by dropping the
rank constraint, we obtain the following relaxed optimization
problem:
minimize
W,V∈HNT ,τ ,a,b,q,z,f
G(W,V) (35)
s.t. C1a,C1b,C2,C3,C4,C6a,C6b,C6c,C7a,C7b,
where q, z, and f denote the collection of optimization
variables qk[n], ∀k, n, zk[n], ∀k, n, and fj,k[n], ∀j, k, n, re-
spectively. The convex optimization problem in (35) can be
efficiently solved by standard convex solvers such as CVX
[23]. A solution of problem (24) can be found by solving (35)
in an iterative manner, where the solution of (35) in iteration i
is used as the initial point for the next iteration i+1. This leads
to a sequence of improved feasible solutions until convergence
to a sub-optimal solution (stationary point) of problem (35), or
equivalently problem (15), in polynomial time [13], [14], [21],
[24]. However, in general, it is difficult to find initial points
satisfying the constraints in (35). Therefore, we address this
issue by penalizing optimization problem (35) in the following
subsection.
C. Proposed Penalized Algorithm
In order to solve (35) using SCA, we require feasible
initial points that satisfies the constraints in (35), especially
constraint C1a. Since it is not easy to find such feasible initial
points, we propose an algorithm which is based on penalizing
optimization problem (35) when the constraints are violated.
The basic idea is to relax the considered problem by adding
slack variables θk ≥ 0, ∀k, to constraint C1a and penalizing
the sum of the violations of the constraints. Thereby, using
this technique, optimization problem (35) can be rewritten as
follows:
minimize
W,V∈HNT ,τ ,a,b,q,z,f ,θ
G(W,V) + β(i)
K∑
k=1
θk (36)
s.t. C1a : Rk(ak)− V˜k(ak)− τk + θk ≥ B
req
k , ∀k,
C1b,C2,C3,C4,C6a,C6b,C6c,C7a,C7b,
C8 : θk ≥ 0, ∀k,
where β(i) is the penalizing weight in iteration i, and θ is
the collection of slack variables θk, ∀k. An iterative algorithm
for solving (14) by repeatedly solving (36) is provided in
Algorithm 1. In the first iteration, by choosing a small penalty
weight β(1) > 0, we allow the QoS constraint to be violated
such that the feasible set is large. Then, in each subsequent
iteration i, we use the solution from the previous iteration as
initial point, increase the penalty weight β(i), and solve prob-
lem (36) again. Continuing this iterative procedure eventually
yields solutions where θk = 0, ∀k, holds, i.e., (35) becomes
equivalent to (36). Moreover, it was shown in [25] that for
sufficiently large values of βmax, Algorithm 1 will yield
the optimal solution for problem (35). The maximum value
βmax for the penalty weight is imposed to avoid numerical
instability.
Remark 1. We note that the optimal solution ofWk[n], ∀k, n,
obtained with Algorithm 1 is not guaranteed to have a rank
equal to or smaller than one, which mandates the use of
rank-one approximation or Gaussian randomization procedures
[26]. In this paper, Gaussian randomization is used to obtain
wk[n], ∀k, n, if the solution Wk[n], ∀k, n, has a rank higher
than one.
Algorithm 1 Penalized Successive Convex Approximation
1: Initialize: random initial points a(1), b(1), q(1), z(1), f (1),
set iteration index i = 1, and maximum number of iterations
Imax, initial penalty factor β
(1) ≫ 1, βmax, η > 1.
2: Repeat
3: Solve convex problem (36) for given a(i), b(i), q(i), z(i),
and f (i), and store the intermediate solutions a, b, q, z, and
f
4: Set i = i + 1 and update a(i) = a, b(i) = b, q(i) = q,
z(i) = z, f (i) = f , and β(i) = min(ηβ(i−1), βmax).
6: Until convergence or i = Imax.
7: Output: W∗ =W and V∗ = V.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide simulation results to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed resource allocation algorithm
design for secure MISO-URLLC systems. In our simulations,
a single cell is considered with inner radius r1 = 50 m and
outer radius r2 = 500 m. The BS is located at the center of
the cell. The URLLC users and eavesdroppers are randomly
distributed within the inner and the outer radius. The path
loss is calculated as 35.3+ 37.6 log10(d) [27], where d is the
distance from the BS to a receiver. The system bandwidth is set
to W = 1 MHz and the frame duration is Tf = 0.25 ms. The
noise power spectral density is −173 dBm/Hz. The parameters
of Algorithm 1 are set as β(1) = 1000, βmax = 5000, and
η = 1.5. The channel gains follow independent Rayleigh
distributions. All simulation results are averaged over 1000
realizations of the channels gains and path losses.
A. Performance Bound and Benchmark Schemes
We compare the performance of the proposed resource
allocation algorithm design with an upper bound, the proposed
algorithm without AN, and a baseline scheme:
• Secrecy capacity: In this scheme, the secrecy capacity
formula for infinite blocklength is used for optimization
in (14), i.e., the dispersions in constraint C1 are set to
zero, but all other constraints are retained. The formulated
optimization problem is solved using SCA to find a sub-
optimal solution. This scheme provides a lower bound on
the total required transmit power of the system.
• Proposed scheme without AN: In this scheme, the
optimization problem is formulated based on the normal
approximation. However, AN is not included in the prob-
lem formulation. The formulated optimization problem is
solved using SCA to find a sub-optimal solution using an
algorithm similar to Algorithm 1.
• Baseline scheme: In this scheme, we employ maxi-
mum ratio transmission beamforming (MRT-BF), where
wk[n] =
√
pk[n]
hk
||hk|| . Then, we optimize the power
allocated to pk[n]. AN is not injected at the BS. The
formulated optimization problem is solved using SCA to
find a sub-optimal solution using an algorithm similar to
Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 2. Convergence of the proposed algorithm (Algorithm 1)
for different simulation parameters. N = 4, ǫk = 10
−6, ∀k,
δ = δj,k = 10
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B. Simulation Results
Fig. 2 shows the convergence of the proposed algorithm for
different numbers of users K , different numbers of antennas
NT , and different numbers of eavesdroppers J . We show the
total transmit power as a function of the number of iterations
for a given channel realization. As can be observed from
Fig. 2, the proposed algorithm converges to a sub-optimal
solution after a finite number of iterations. In particular, the
proposed algorithm converges after approximately 5 iterations
for all considered parameter values. Moreover, as can be seen,
for the considered cases, the speed of convergence of the
proposed algorithm is not sensitive to the numbers of users,
antennas, and eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 3, we investigate the average transmit power versus
the number of antennas at the BS, NT , for different resource
allocation schemes. As can be observed, the total transmit
power at the BS significantly decreases as the number of
antennas at the BS increases. This is due to the fact that
more antennas offer additional degrees of freedom for resource
allocation which facilitate higher received SINRs at the users.
The proposed scheme attains large power savings compared
to the baseline scheme. The performance loss of the baseline
scheme has two reasons. First, the fixed beamformer is strictly
sub-optimal. Second, the baseline scheme does not have the
capability to impair the eavesdroppers’ channel due to the
absence of AN. Moreover, the proposed scheme without AN
still achieves a good performance compared with the baseline
scheme due to the precise beamforming. Furthermore, if the
secrecy capacity is used for resource allocation design for
URLLC, the required latency, reliability, and secrecy cannot
be guaranteed. This is due to the fact that the performance
loss incurred by finite block length coding is not taken into
account, and the obtained resource allocation policies do not
meet the QoS constraints.
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In Fig. 4, we show the average transmit power for the
proposed scheme versus the required number of secure com-
munication bits, Breqk , ∀k, for different system parameters. In
particular, we study the impact of the number of eavesdrop-
pers, J , the secrecy constraint on the information leakage,
δ = δj,k, ∀j, k, and different delay requirements. We consider
the following delay scenarios: For delay scenario S1 = {D1 =
2, Dk = 4, ∀k 6= 1}, one user has strict delay constraints
while the remaining users do not. For delay scenario S2 =
{Dk = 2, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, D5 = D6 = 4}, four users have
strict delay requirements. As expected, increasing the required
number of transmitted bits leads to higher transmit powers.
This is due to the fact that if more bits are to be transmitted in a
frame, higher SINRs are needed for each user, and thus, the BS
has to increase the transmitted power. Fig. 4 also shows that if
the number of eavesdroppers increases, the average transmitted
power has to also increase to meet the users’ QoS. This stems
from the fact that if more eavesdroppers are in the system, the
BS has to increase the amount of AN power to degrade the
channels of all eavesdroppers to guarantee secrecy. Moreover,
as can be observed, the proposed scheme is able to guarantee
secure communication even if the number of eavesdroppers
exceeds the number of transmit antenna NT , due to the precise
beamforming and AN design. Furthermore, more stringent
constraints on the information leakage δ increases the required
transmit power because more AN power is needed to impair
the channel of eavesdroppers to a sufficient degree.
Fig. 4 also reveals the effect of the delay constraints.
In particular, delay scenario S2 leads to a higher power
consumption compared to S1 because the BS is forced to
allocate more power to the delay sensitive users even if their
channel conditions are poor to ensure their transmissions are
completed with the desired delay.
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Fig. 4. Average transmit power versus number of secure bits
per packet. K = 6, NT = 8, N = 4, ǫk = 10
−7, ∀k.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the resource allocation algorithm
design for secure multi-user downlink MISO-URLLC systems.
To enhance PLS, AN was injected by the BS to impair the
channel of the eavesdroppers. To meet the stringent delay
requirements of URLLC users, short packet transmission was
adopted and taken into consideration for secure resource
allocation design. The resource allocation algorithm design
was formulated as an optimization problem for minimization
of the total transmit power subject to QoS constraints ensuring
the reliability, secrecy, and latency of the URLLC users. The
obtained optimization problem was shown to be non-convex
but a low-complexity algorithm based on penalized SCA was
developed to find a sub-optimal solution. Simulation results
showed that the proposed resource allocation algorithm design
facilities secure transmission in URLLC systems, and yields a
large reduction of the transmit power compared to a baseline
scheme.
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